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MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY SYNDROME: 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OR WORK-RELATED 
ACCIDENT? 
Kelly Corbett* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Helen Keplinger marvels over the fact that the chemicals she en-
countered in her work-place, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) headquarters in Washington, D.C., rendered 
her chemically sensitive for the rest of her life.! When Keplinger first 
moved into the newly painted and carpeted EPA building in 1985, she 
began experiencing daily headaches, congestion, dizziness, and fa-
tigue.2 In addition, she began to hear a constant "whooshing" sound 
in her ears and noticed that she would lose her voice every Monday 
morning after a weekend away from the office.3 By 1987, Keplinger 
had become so dizzy and fatigued that she was unable to jog around 
her neighborhood as she had done every evening for the previous 
twelve years.4 The chemical exposure affected her work performance 
as well.5 She could not keep track of important appointments or re-
member on which projects she was working.6 
In 1989, the solvent smell in the EPA headquarters became so 
extreme during the reroofing, painting, and wallpapering of the build-
* Articles Editor, 1996--1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Helen Keplinger, Patient Statement: Chemically Sensitive, 10 TOXICOLOGY AND INDUS. 
HEALTH 313, 313 (1994). 
2Id. 
3Id. at 313-14. 
4Id. at 314. 
5Id. 
6 Keplinger, supra note 1, at 314. 
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ing that the employees were evacuated from the building.7 After this 
office remodeling, Keplinger not only became ill from the chemicals in 
her office, but also started having adverse reactions to everyday 
chemical exposures.s She no longer could drive behind, or ride in, a 
bus without experiencing severe nausea.9 She could not sit near peo-
ple who were wearing perfume or cologne.IO Keplinger's symptoms 
expanded to include frequent nose bleeds, twitching in her left eye, 
and constant feelings of depression and anger.ll Today, Keplinger's 
condition forces her to work from her home.12 She cannot pump gas, 
walk through the detergent aisle in the supermarket, read a newspa-
per, or even enter a shopping mall,13 She does not expect many people 
to believe her story-many doctors do not,14 However, Keplinger is 
only one of more than sixty EPA employees who no longer can work 
at the EPA headquarters because of chemical sensitivities.15 
In a similar instance, police found Cynthia Wilson, a successful 
commercial real estate developer and general contractor, wandering 
around in fifteen inches of snow in below-zero weather without shoes 
or a coat.16 When the police took her to the hospital, doctors diagnosed 
Wilson with formaldehyde poisoning.17 The diagnosis seemed reason-
able given her line of work as a general contractor. IS More troubling, 
however, was that she continued to experience symptoms of the poi-
soning at low exposure levels that the government considered to be 
safe.19 Since her initial exposure to formaldehyde, Wilson is sensitive 
to a whole range of other common chemicals.20 She gets hemolytic 
hematuria, commonly characterized by blood in urine, from freshly 
cut wood and new carpeting,21 The smoke from her neighbors' wood 
stoves causes her to have bronchial pneumonia for most of the winter, 
7Id. at 315. 
8Id. 
9Id. 
10Id. 
11 See Keplinger, supra note 1, at 316. 
12 See id. 
13Id. 
14 See id. at 316-17. 
15Id. at 317. 
16 Cynthia Wilson, Patient Statement: Chemically Sensitive, 10 'IbXICOLOGY AND INDUS. 
HEALTH 319, 319 (1994). 
17Id. 
18Id. 
19Id. 
20 I d. at 320. 
21 See Wilson, supra note 16, at 320. 
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and touching printed material like newspapers and magazines causes 
her hands and feet to swell and bruise.22 Phenol-based products send 
Wilson into cardiac distress, and many different chemical exposures 
give her daily headaches that are so intensely painful that they distort 
her vision and hearing.23 Wilson experiences fatigue so acute that she 
often falls off chairs, or falls to the floor where she has been standing.24 
More troubling is the neurological damage she sustained from chemi-
cal exposures.25 She no longer has much short term memory, and 
cannot do even simple math without a calculator.26 Wilson does not 
hold out much hope that her condition will improve.27 She spends most 
of her time trying to isolate herself from any type of chemical expo-
sure.28 
Countless narratives of chemical sensitivities similar to those of 
Keplinger and Wilson indicate that Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syn-
drome (MCS) is a clinical disease caused by exposure to combinations 
of low-level environmental chemicals.29 Despite these indications, how-
ever, the medical community has neither defined MCS medically nor 
created a diagnostic test for the disease.3o In the last few years, 
employees seeking workers' disability compensation for MCS have 
brought several lawsuits alleging that they developed MCS from 
toxins and chemicals in their work environments.31 As of this time, no 
MCS sufferers have been able to persuade triers of fact that their 
22 See id. 
22ld. 
2A ld. 
25ld. 
26 See Wilson, supra note 16, at 319. 
27 See id. at 320. 
28ld. 
29 See Claudia S. Miller, White Paper: Chemical Sensitivity: History and Phenomenology, 10 
TOXICOLOGY AND INDUS. HEALTH 253, 258 (1994). 
30 See Patricia J. Sparks, et aI., Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: A Clinical Perspec-
tive, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 718, 719 (1994). 
31 McCreary v. Industrial Comm'n, 835 P.2d 469, 470 (Ariz. ct. App. 1992); Harris v. Central 
Arkansas Maintenance, No. CA 93-655,1994 WL 146333, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1994); 
Weekley v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Armstrong v. City of 
Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 925 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Dobbs v. Board of Supervisors, 588 So. 2d 764, 
765 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Helinski v. C & P Tel. Co., 672 A.2d 155, 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); 
Ruether v. State, 455 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Minn. 1990); Appeal of Kehoe, 648 A.2d 472, 473 (N.H. 
1994); Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 811 P.2d 1313, 1315 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Yanarella v. 
IBM Corp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Saif Corp. v. Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 1189 
(Or. Ct. App. 1992); Chanin v. Eastern Virginia Med. Sch., 459 S.E.2d 523, 523 (Va. Ct. App. 
1995); Smith v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., No. 1048-94-1, 1995 WL 228247, at *1 (Va. Ct. 
App. Apr. 18, 1995); Conradt v. Mt. Carmel Sch., 539 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
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work environment both caused MCS and left them totally and perma-
nently disabled.32 
The plaintiffs' strategy used in all the MCS workers' compensation 
cases has been to fit MCS into the particular state statute's definition 
of an "occupational disease."33 This approach has not been successful 
because claimants have had trouble proving that their MCS arose out 
of and in the course of their employment, as opposed to being just a 
common disease of everyday life.34 Additionally, claimants have had 
trouble proving that their MCS stemmed from the duties of their 
particular employment.35 
An alternative approach claimants could use to obtain workers' 
compensation in these cases would be to define MCS as a work-related 
"accident" instead of an "occupational disease."36 Sufferers of Cumu-
lative Trauma Disorders (CTDs), occupational disorders similar to 
MCS in several respects, have been successful in obtaining workers' 
compensation by fitting the disorders into state statutory definitions 
of accident.37 Based on the success of workers' compensation claims 
for CTDs, which define the syndrome as an accident, MCS sufferers 
may find the accident approach a more useful method for obtaining 
workers' compensation for their work-derived ailments.3s 
This Comment explores this alternative claim for MCS sufferers 
seeking workers' compensation. Specifically, the Comment focuses on 
the failure of employees with MCS to obtain benefits by claiming 
occupational disease, and highlights the accident claim as a potentially 
32 See McCreary, 835 P.2d at 470; Hams, 1994 WL 146333, at *1; Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60; 
Armstrong, 907 P.2d at 925; Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 765; Helinski, 672 A.2d at 157; Ruether, 455 
N.W.2d at 476; Kehoe, 648 A.2d at 473; Fuyat, 811 P.2d at 1315; Yanarella, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 769; 
SaifCorp., 824 P.2d at 1189; Chanin, 459 S.E.2d at 523; Smith, 1995 WL 228247, at *1; Conradt, 
539 N.W.2d at 714. 
33 See, e.g., Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60; Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 765. 
34 See, e.g., Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 62; Ruether, 455 N.W.2d at 477. 
35 See, e.g., McCreary, 835 P.2d at 474--75; Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60--61. 
36 Lockeby v. Massey Pulpwood, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); Castaneda v. 
Illinois Indus. Comm'n, 596 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Condon v. Boeing Co., 903 
P.2d 775, 777 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Parks v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 340 So. 2d 276, 281 (La. 
1976); Robin v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1030, 1033-34 (La. Ct. App. 
1994); Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 610 So. 2d 953, 955 (La. Ct. App. 
1992); Scanlan v. Bernard Lumber Co., 365 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Bodily v. John Jump 
Trucking, Inc., 819 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Mont. 1991); Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 
440,445 (Neb. 1992); Hayes v. A.M. Cohron, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Neb. 1987); Sandel v. 
Packaging Co. of Am., 317 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Neb. 1982); Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 
373, 376 (Tenn. 1991). 
37 See, e.g., Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 701; Castaneda, 596 N.E.2d at 1282. 
38 See infra Section VI. 
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more useful method for obtaining compensation. Section II focuses on 
MCS, detailing both the history and health effects of the syndrome. 
Section III describes the state system of workers' compensation and 
lays out the statutory requirements that an MCS sufferer must prove 
in order to receive workers' compensation under both accident and 
occupational disease claims. Section IV examines the workers' com-
pensation cases in which workers claimed they developed MCS as a 
result of their employment, as well as the reasons why these occupa-
tional disease claims were unsuccessful. Section V examines broaden-
ing judicial interpretations of statutory accident definitions. This sec-
tion uses CTDs, work-related disorders similar to MCS, to illustrate 
the judicial trend of liberalizing accident statutory requirements. Sec-
tion VI proposes that MCS claimants may find accident claims more 
useful than occupational disease claims for obtaining disability com-
pensation. 
II. MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY SYNDROME (MCS) 
A. History of MCS 
About thirty-five years ago, allergist Theron Randolph first de-
scribed the phenomenon of chemical sensitivity when he diagnosed 
his wife with a "petrochemical problem" after observing her become 
ill when exposed to derivatives of gas, oil, and coal.39 Randolph's 
description of his wife's symptoms matches some of the more common 
symptoms we associate with MCS sufferers today, including respira-
tory problems, headaches, fatigue, irritability, and depression.40 Ran-
dolph advised his wife and patients with similar complaints to avoid 
certain common chemical exposures and prescribed sauna therapy 
and vitamin and mineral supplementation to treat the illness.41 The 
theory behind Randolph's practices was "that ecologic illness is mani-
fested as a reaction to environmental insults associated with air, water, 
food, drugs, and our habitat as modified by individual susceptibility 
in terms of specific adaptation of the patients reacting as a biologic 
unit."42 Additionally, Randolph attributed stress and frequency of ex-
39 Thomas L. Kurt, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities-A Syndrome of Pseudotoxity Manifest 
as Exposure Perceived Symptoms, 33 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 101, 101 (1995); Miller, supra note 
29, at 253. 
40 Miller, supra note 29, at 253. 
41Id. 
42 Deborah F. Dubin, Americans with Disabilities Act Accommodation Issues May Apply to 
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posure as the primary causes for reactions to environmental sub-
stances.43 The contemporary medical community criticizes followers 
of Randolph's controversial methods, known as "clinical ecologists," 
for their lack of critical thinking and scientific testing.44 When the 
medical community discredited the clinical ecologists, it also discred-
ited the disease that the ecologists purported to be curing, MCS.45 
In 1991, physicians finally separated MCS from their concerns about 
the approaches of the clinical ecologists and began to recognize the 
syndrome as a clinical illness.46 The National Research Council, the 
EPA, and the National Institute of Mental Health Sciences brought 
together clinicians, toxicologists, immunologists, epidemiologists, psy-
chiatrists, and psychologists to develop research recommendations for 
studying MCS.47 In the fall of 1991, the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry sponsored a second national meeting on MCS 
with the Association of Occupational and Environmental Clinics.48 
MCS became a governmental concern in 1993 when the United States 
Congress directed the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Reg-
istry to use $250,000 of its budget for research on low-level chemical 
sensitivities.49 Finally, in 1994, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
proposed to develop Environmental Hazards Research Centers in 
veterans hospitals in order to study medical ailments that Persian 
Gulf War veterans attribute to exposures from oil well fires, paints, 
fuels, pesticides, and other toxins.50 These large research initiatives 
indicate that the government and the medical community are begin-
ning to recognize MCS as a clinical illness.51 
Environmental Illness, 11 HEALTHSPAN 22 (1994) (quoting LAWRENCE D. DICKEY, CLINICAL 
ECOLOGY 5 (1976». For a discussion on the history of the clinical ecology movement see Alvin 
C. Bronstein, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities-New Paradigm Needed, 33 CLINICAL ToXICOL-
OGY 93, 94 (1995); Abba 1. Terr, "Multiple Chemical Sensitivities:" Immunologic Critique of 
Clinical Ecology Theories and Practice, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 655, 683-93 (1987); Miller, 
supra note 29, at 254. 
43 See Bronstein, supra note 42, at 94; Miller, supra note 29, at 254; Dubin, supra note 42, at 
22-24; Terr, supra note 42, 686-87. 
44 Miller, supra note 29, at 254. 
45 See Kurt, supra note 39, at 103; Miller, supra note 29, at 254. 
46 Miller, supra note 29, at 254. 
47 I d. at 255. 
481d. 
49 Id. at 256. 
50ld, 
51 See Miller, supra note 29, at 256. 
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B. The Health Effects of MCS 
Current clinical observations by the medical community indicate 
that cases of MCS develop in a two-step process.52 In the first stage 
of sensitization, patients develop symptoms after exposure to high 
levels of environmental chemicals, or after continuous and repeated 
exposure to lower levels of chemicals.53 Exposure to pesticides, sol-
vents, combustion products, indoor air pollutants, drugs, and anes-
thetics commonly cause sensitization. 54 Common symptoms stemming 
from the initial exposure include fatigue, respiratory problems, memory 
loss, difficulty concentrating, dizziness, gastrointestinal problems, de-
pression, headaches, muscle aches, chest pain, nausea, and irritability.55 
Following this sensitization stage, patients enter into a triggering 
stage where chemicals unrelated to the original sensitizing event 
begin to trigger symptoms.56 As part of this spreading phenomenon, 
patients suffer severe symptoms from low levels of common, every-
day chemicals such as tobacco smoke, gasoline, traffic exhaust, clean-
ing agents, hair spray, and perfumeP Again, the same host of symp-
toms including fatigue, dizziness, headaches, respiratory problems, 
chest pain, muscle aches, memory loss, depression, and irritability 
occur from exposure to these everyday chemicals.58 
52 [d. at 258--63. For a discussion on this two-step process see generally Sparks, supra note 
30, at 718-36; Mark R. Cullen, The Worker with Multiple Chemical Sensitivities: An Overview, 
2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 655, 655-61 (1987). 
53 Cullen, supra note 52, at 657. 
54 Miller, supra note 29, at 257. 
55 [d. at 266. 
56 [d. at 260. 
57 [d. 
68 [d. Dr. Mark R. Cullen's definition of MCS is the most widely used clinical definition: 
MCS is an acquired disorder characterized by recurrent symptoms, referable to 
multiple organ systems, occurring in response to demonstrable exposure to many 
chemically unrelated compounds at doses far below those established in the general 
population to cause harmful effects. No single widely accepted test of physiologic 
function can be shown to correlate with symptoms. 
Cullen, supra note 52, at 657. For another commonly cited definition of MCS see the clinical 
definition by Ashford and Miller: 
1. Symptoms involving virtually any system in the body or several systems simulta-
neously, but most frequently the central nervous system (fatigue, mood changes, 
memory and concentration difficulties). 
2. Different symptoms and severity in different individuals, even among those expe-
riencing the same exposure. 
3. Induction or sensitization by a wide range of environmental agents, including 
pesticides, solvents, and combustion products. 
4. Subsequent triggering by lower levels of exposure than those involved in initial 
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Because the medical community only recently discovered the link 
between these symptoms and MCS, a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
for preventing the syndrome is nonexistent.59 The recent interest in 
studying MCS, however, demonstrates that the syndrome is clearly a 
national concern that carries with it extensive public policy and regu-
latory· ramifications.60 
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTES 
Workers' compensation is a state system that compensates workers 
who have sustained physical or mental injuries due to their jobs.6! No 
overarching federal system of compensation exists, and the federal 
government only provides coverage for maritime workers on naviga-
ble waters of the United States and to employees of the United States 
Government.62 Workers' compensation systems benefit employees and 
induction of the illness. 
5. Spreading of sensitivity to other, often chemically dissimilar substances. Each 
substance may trigger a different but reproducible constellation of symptoms. 
6. Concomitant food, alcohol, and medication intolerances, estimated to occur in a 
sizable percentage of MCS patients. 
See Miller, supra note 29, at 261. 
59 See Dubin, supra note 42, at 24-25. 
60 Miller, supra note 29, at 256. 
61 JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1 (1989). Before states 
adopted workers' compensation systems, the only way for injured workers to obtain compen-
sation for injuries occurring in the work-place was to sue the employer for negligence. Barry 
Bennett, Workers' Compensation and the Laborer: Reflections of an Uninjured Jurist, 11 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 211, 212 (1990). Yet common law defenses to negligence such as 
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule made it extremely 
difficult for workers to recover. [d. After the industrial revolution in the late nineteenth century, 
the industrial injury and death rate exploded and states began to pass employer liability laws 
to make it easier for workers to recover from these work-place accidents. [d. at 213-14. These 
first employer liability laws weakened common law defenses, making it easier for workers to 
win suits. [d. at 214. In addition, under these new laws, employers began to settle lawsuits with 
substantial settlements rather than taking the risk of losing in court. [d. Because businesses 
were concerned about the uncertainty of the potential cost of industrial accidents, reform 
became inevitable. [d. 
New York established the first compulsory state workers' compensation system in 1910, but 
the New York Court of Appeals struck the system down as unconstitutional the next year 
because the state had exceeded its police powers by imposing strict liability without fault on 
certain categories of occupations. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
§ 5.20 (rev. ed. 1995). Instead of abolishing workers' compensation altogether, New York 
amended its constitution to solve the constitutionality question. [d. Then, just six years later, 
the United States Supreme Court approved of employee compensation systems in New York Cent. 
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 189-90 (1917), and shortly after the decision every state in the 
United States adopted its own state workers' compensation laws. Bennett, supra note 61, at 215. 
62 NACKLEY, supra note 61, at 1. 
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their families by supplying no-fault recovery for injuries and diseases 
arising out of and in the course of employment.63 In addition, these 
systems also benefit employers, who often are obligated to pay less 
under workers' compensation laws than from potentially high jury 
verdicts after costly courtroom battles.64 
Although states originally created compensation systems to com-
pensate victims of industrial accidents, over time state legislatures 
have amended their systems to include compensation for occupational 
diseases.65 The basic tenet of all workers' compensation systems is 
that workers claiming benefits must prove that their disability "arose 
out of and in the course of employment."66 In order to prove that their 
disability arose out of their employment, claimants must choose to 
define their disability as either an "accident" or an "occupational 
disease," and then must satisfy the requirements of causation under 
the definition they choose.67 Although each state has its own compen-
sation laws, the similarities among the statutes' provisions are so 
substantial that these statutes can be discussed in terms of general 
principles.68 
63 [d. 
64 In all states, administrative agencies called industrial commissions, boards of workers' 
compensation, or industrial accident boards make workers' disability compensation decisions. 
[d. at 73. The power of these agencies to hear disputes between claimants and employers is 
limited to the terms of state statutes and constitutional restrictions. [d. at 65-67. The rules of 
evidence are not applied strictly in agency proceedings, but the evidence must be substantially 
probative and relevant to support an agency's findings. [d. at 87. All states also provide for 
judicial review of these administrative agency decisions. [d. at 87-88. In a majority of states, 
the review is limited to issues of law with a possible appeal of factual questions if the agency's 
finding was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. [d. at 8:h'l5. Claimants have the 
burden of proving the work-place disability in court and generally must prove their case by a 
preponderance of the evidence. [d. at 77. 
Workers' compensation boards require that claimants prove the causal connection between 
their accidents or diseases and the work-place by expert medical testimony. H. Douglas Jones 
& Cathy Jackson, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: A Repetitive Strain on the Workers' Com-
pensation System, 20 N. Ky. L. REV. 765, 767 (1993). This medical testimony must consist of a 
diagnosis of the claimant's disorder, and a statement as to the presence or absence of causation 
from a medical standpoint. [d. Using the expert medical testimony, as well as all other evidence, 
the trier of fact ultimately must determine whether or not a disorder arose from the work-place. 
Ruether v. State, 455 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Minn. 1990). 
65 See generally LARSON, supra note 61, § 41. 
66 [d. § 6-13.24 (discussing the "arising out of and in the course of' test). 
67 NACKLEY, supra note 61, at 2--3; see generally LARSON, supra note 61, § 37-41 (discussing 
accident and occupational disease claims). 
68 NACKLEY, supra note 61, at 2. 
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A. Accident Claims Versus Occupational Disease Claims 
The most common type of workers' compensation claim is an acci-
dent claim.69 An accident often is described as a tangible happening 
of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause resulting in either 
external or internal physical harm.70 Accident claims are compensable 
under state workers' compensation acts if claimants can prove that 
the disability arose out of and in the course of their employment.71 To 
prove that an accident arose out of the work-place, employees gener-
ally have to satisfy two requirements.72 First, employees must prove 
that the accident was sudden, having an identifiable moment of in-
jury.73 Second, employees must show that the accident was unex-
pected and unintended.74 
Similar to accident claimants, workers claiming occupational dis-
ease also must prove that the illness arose out of and in the course of 
employment.75 In order to satisfy this causal link, claimants must 
prove that the disease is due to causes and conditions characteristic 
of a particular employment.76 As part of this requirement, claimants 
must prove that the nature of their employment exposes them to a 
greater risk of the disease than the risk experienced by the general 
public.77 In other words, claimants must prove that specific toxins or 
materials found at work sites caused the disease.78 Additionally, many 
statutes require that the hazards causing the disease be peculiar to a 
claimant's particular occupation and job tasks.79 
69 [d. at 11. 
70 [d. For example, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Statute describes a work-place 
accident as: "an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently, with or 
without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of injury." NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 48.151(2) (1995); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901(12) (1995). 
71 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901(12); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2). 
72 LARSON, supra note 61, § 37.20. 
73 [d. 
74 [d. 
75 [d. § 41.00 
76 [d. § 41.30-.32. 
77 Larson, supra note 61, § 41.30-32. 
78 Joan Hansen, Scientific Decisionmaking in Workers' Compensation: A Long Overdue Re-
form, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 911, 912 (1986). 
79 [d. For example, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Statute describes an occupational 
disease as: 
"[O]nly a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are peculiar to a 
particular trade, occupation, or process of employment and shall exclude all ordinary 
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed." 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.151(3) (1995); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1993); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 656.802(1) (1994). 
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Contrary to the definition of a work-place accident, state legisla-
tures do not consider occupational diseases to be unexpected or unin-
tended.80 Occupational diseases are merely an inherent risk of continued 
exposure to the conditions of an individual's employment.81 Further-
more, the onset of the disorder does not need to be sudden.82 Occupa-
tional diseases may be caused by one work-place exposure, or by a 
gradual exposure to substances or conditions inherent in the work-
place, as long as a claimant can link the disease to an employment 
environment.83 
In general, employees suffering from accidents have more success 
securing workers' compensation benefits than do employees suffering 
from occupational diseases.84 The primary reason for this compensa-
tion inequity is that state statutes make the causation requirement 
between the disability and the work-place harder to prove in occupa-
tional disease cases than in accident cases.85 There are more stringent 
causation requirements for occupational diseases because state gov-
ernments often assume that accidents are relatively easy to link to 
the work-place, while the link between claimants' diseases and their 
work-places is not always as obvious.86 Thus, workers' compensation 
statutes only require accidents to be sudden and unexpected, while 
these same statutes require occupational disease claimants to prove 
that their diseases are both peculiar to their particular occupation and 
not ordinary diseases of life.87 This peculiarity requirement is often 
extremely difficult for employees to satisfy because the precise causes 
of occupational diseases are usually difficult to diagnose.88 Even if a 
medical basis exists to determine the cause of a particular disease, 
there may be no records or proof establishing an employee's length of 
exposure to certain toxins or environmental hazards.89 
80 FREEDMAN, THE LAW AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURY, DISEASE, AND DEATH 3 (1990). 
81 LARSON, supra note 61, § 41; FREEDMAN, supra note 80, at 4. 
82 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10; OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(1). 
83 See W. Kip Vicusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compen-
sation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 54 (1984). 
84 See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1981 BLS BULLETIN 
2164, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY (1983); 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1987 BLS BULLETIN 2328, OCCUPA-
TIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY (1989). 
85 See Vicusi, supra note 83, at 63. 
86 Id. at 54. 
87 Id. at 63: 
f'BId. 
89 Id. 
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In addition to restrictive causation requirements, the latency pe-
riod associated with many occupational illnesses also hampers at-
tempts to secure workers' compensation.90 The latent onset of many 
occupational illnesses makes it difficult for claimants to find evidence 
to prove their diseases are employment-related.91 Additionally, the 
time required for many occupational diseases to develop conflicts with 
statutory requirements that workers file disability claims within a 
specific period of time.92 The delayed onset of many occupational dis-
eases hinders workers both from realizing that they have a compen-
sable disability and from filing their claim before the applicable stat-
ute of limitations has expired.93 
As of this time, all MCS workers' compensation claimants have filed 
for disability benefits under statutory definitions of occupational dis-
ease.94 Not one of these MCS sufferers has been able to convince a 
judge that the medical condition of MCS can completely satisfy the 
requirements of the statutory occupational disease definition.95 
IV. MCS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES BASED ON 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS 
In the limited number of workers' compensation cases focusing on 
MCS, not a single court in any state has awarded workers' compen-
sation based on the theory that MCS is a permanently and totally 
disabling occupational disease.96 There are several reasons for this 
lack of success. First, because causation in workers' compensation 
90 See Vicusi, supra note 83, at 63. 
91 [d. 
92 [d. 
93 [d. 
94 McCreary v. Industrial Comm'n, 835 P.2d 469, 470 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Harris v. Central 
Arkansas Maintenance, No. CA 934i55, 1994 WL 146333, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 20,1994); 
Weekley v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Armstrong v. City of 
Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 925 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Dobbs v. Board of Supervisors, 588 So. 2d 764, 
765 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Helinski v. C & P Tel. Co., 672 A.2d 155, 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); 
Ruether v. State, 455 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Minn. 1990); Appeal of Kehoe, 648 A.2d 472, 473 (N.H. 
1994); Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 811 P.2d 1313, 1315 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Yanarella v. 
IBM Corp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Saif Corp. v. Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 1189 
(Or. Ct. App. 1992); Chanin v. Eastern Virginia Med. Sch., 459 S.E.2d 523, 523 (Va. Ct. App. 
1995); Smith v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., No. 1048--94-1, 1995 WL 228247, at *1 (Va. Ct. 
App. Apr. 18, 1995); Conradt v. Mt. Carmel Sch., 539 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
95 McCreary, 835 P.2d at 470; Hams, 1994 WL 146333, at *1; Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60; 
Armstrong, 907 P.2d at 925; Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 765; Helinski, 672 A.2d at 157; Ruether, 455 
N.W.2d at 476; Kehoe, 648 A.2d at 473; Fuyat, 811 P.2d at 1315; Yanarella, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 769; 
SaifCorp., 824 P.2d at 1189; Chanin, 459 S.E.2d at 523; Smith, 1995 WL 228247, at *1; Conradt, 
539 N.W.2d at 715. 
96 See supra note 94. 
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cases has to be proven with medical evidence, most cases involve 
conflicting medical testimony.97 Courts often reject medical testimony 
linking MCS with the work-place, thereby denying compensation, 
because MCS has not yet gained full acceptance as a clinical disease.98 
Second, even if judges believe that MCS is a clinical disease, many 
still deny compensation based on the fact that the illness cannot arise 
out of the work-place because it is an illness to which people are 
exposed equally outside of the work-place.99 Furthermore, courts often 
deny compensation by noting that MCS is not peculiar to the employ-
ment of a claimant, and therefore could not stem from an employee's 
actual duties or tasks.1Oo 
In the few cases where courts have awarded compensation to MCS 
sufferers, they did so based on the existence of other illnesses and 
refused to recognize MCS as the cause of the disability.101 Moreover, 
the one court that compensated an employee suffering from MCS 
evidently did not understand the full ramifications of the illness as a 
totally debilitating disease, because the court only awarded the claim-
ant partial disability.lo2 
A. Cases Denying Compensation: MCS Perceived as an Ordinary 
Disease of Everyday Life 
In many cases, courts denied compensation to MCS claimants rea-
soning that the disease could derive from non-work related factors 
found in the ordinary course of living.lo3 Several courts have held that 
claimant's work environments could not have caused their illness 
because MCS is an ordinary disease of everyday life to which the 
general public is equally exposed.I04 For instance, in the 1990 case of 
Ruether v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the workers' 
compensation board's decision to deny benefits to a laboratory assis-
tant who claimed to have developed a multitude of symptoms includ-
ing headaches, gastrointestinal pain, and shortness of breath, from 
97 See, e.g., Harris, 1994 WL 146333, at *2-3; Smith, 1995 WL 228247, at *2. 
98 See Harris, 1994 WL 146333, at *2-3; Smith, 1995 WL 228247, at *2. 
99 See Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60; Ruether, 455 N.W.2d at 476. 
100 See McCreary v. Industrial Comm'n, 835 P.2d 469, 470 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Weekley, 615 
N.E.2d at 60. 
101 See Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Dobbs v. Board 
of Supervisors, 588 So. 2d 764, 764 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Fuyat v. Los Alamos N at'l Lab., 811 P.2d 
1313, 1315 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Saif Corp. v. Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
102 Yanarella v. IBM Corp., 599 N.y'S.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
103 See Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60; Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 764; Reuther, 455 N.W.2d at 477. 
104 See Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 60; Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 764; Reuther, 455 N.W.2d at 477. 
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her work environment.lo5 The claimant attributed these symptoms to 
three identified episodes of exposure to certain chemicals in the lab 
which she claimed led to an acquired intolerance to chemicals.lo6 The 
compensation board found that the employee did, in fact, suffer from 
chemical sensitivities.lo7 The judge refused benefits, however, reason-
ing that the employee's condition was not caused by her employment, 
but rather was an ordinary disease of life to which the general pub-
lic equally is exposed.108 Accordingly, the court affirmed the board's 
finding that the claimant had not sustained a compensable occupa-
tional disease. 109 
Similarly, in the 1993 case of Weekley v. Industrial Commission, 
the Illinois Appellate Court affinned the workers' compensation board's 
denial of disability benefits based on the reasoning that MCS could 
not be caused by the work-place because it was a disease to which the 
general public also was exposed.110 The employee contended that she 
developed MCS after MidCon Corporation remodeled its office space 
by painting, hanging wallpaper, and laying carpet.111 After this expo-
sure, the employee experienced severe nausea, dizziness, fatigue, fa-
cial pain, and disorientation.112 The claimant believed that in addition 
to the symptoms suffered immediately after the remodeling, this first 
exposure also triggered her permanent hypersensitivity to other eve-
ryday chemicals such as perfumes, auto fumes, gasoline, cigarette 
smoke, newspaper, hair spray, deodorizers, fabric softeners, and dust.113 
Again, the court in this case denied benefits on the basis that the 
claimant did not establish any type of risk in her work environment 
greater than that to which the general public is exposed.114 
B. Cases Denying Compensation: MCS Not Peculiar to Individual 
Employment Duties 
Along with the belief that MCS is an ordinary disease of everyday 
life, courts also have denied compensation to MCS claimants based on 
105 Reuther, 455 N.W.2d at 477. 
106 [d. 
107 [d. 
108 [d. 
109 [d. 
llO See Weekley v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
111 [d. at 61. 
ll2 [d. 
ll3 [d. 
ll4 [d. at 62. 
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the re~soning that their disorder did not result from conditions pecu-
liar to their particular occupational tasks.115 This requirement often is 
not met in MCS cases because MCS usually is caused by toxins in the 
work-place environment that have nothing to do with claimants' ac-
tual work dutiesY6 
For example, in the 1992 case of McCreary v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Arizona, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the workers' 
compensation board's denial of benefits to a computer engineer be-
cause it determined that office construction and remodeling was not 
an unavoidable risk stemming from the nature of the claimant's em-
ployment as an engineer. ll7 The employee claimed that his chemical 
sensitivities began after he was exposed to chemicals from the con-
struction of a new work facility.118 '!\vo months after the move, the 
employee said that his symptoms of sinus pains, headaches, fatigue, 
depression, loss of concentration, inability to complete sentences, and 
vision problems were unbearable.l19 The court affirmed the board's 
conclusion that the employee's MCS was not an occupational disease 
because it did not result from causes and conditions peculiar to his 
employment.12o 
Employing reasoning similar to the McCreary court, the Illinois 
Appellate Court in Weekley v. Industrial Commission also denied 
benefits, reasoning that MCS was not a risk stemming from the em-
ployee's occupational duties. l2l Again, because office redecorating was 
not an inherent risk of the claimant's job as a secretary, the court 
found that her disorder was not particular to her employment.122 
C. Cases Denying Compensation: MCS Not Considered a 
Clinical Disease 
Several courts have affirmed workers' compensation boards' deci-
sions to deny disability benefits to MCS sufferers because there is no 
diagnostic test to support a finding of MCS and no generally accepted 
115 See, e.g., McCreary v. Industrial Comm'n, 835 P.2d 469, 473-74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); 
Weekley v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Helinski v. C & P Tel. Co., 
672 A.2d 155, 159 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
116 See McCreary, 835 P.2d at 473-74; Weekley, 615 N.E.2d at 62. 
117 McCreary, 835 P.2d at 473. 
118Id. at 471. 
119Id. at 470. 
12°Id. at 475. 
121 See Weekley v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
122Id. 
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scientific understanding of causation for the condition.123 Harkening 
back to the poor reputation of clinical ecologists, these courts have 
reasoned that the medical community has not completely accepted 
MCS as a clinical syndrome.l24 
In the 1994 case of Harris v. Central Arkansas Maintenance, the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of workers' compen-
sation based on the reasoning that a MCS diagnosis is still controver-
sial within established medicine.125 The employee claimed that the 
cleaning solutions she used in her job cleaning restrooms and trash 
cans at a public park caused her not only to suffer symptoms of 
headaches, rashes, nausea, diarrhea, and fatigue at the time she was 
cleaning, but that the incident triggered her sensitivity toward a 
multitude of common chemicals.126 Although the medical data in the 
case was conflicting, the doctor who testified that the claimant was 
completely disabled was a specialist in clinical ecology.127 Accordingly, 
the court gave less weight to his opinion than to the testimony of the 
defendant's doctors who found no chemical sensitivities, and denied 
the employee's claim for disability compensation.128 
Similarly, in the 1995 decision of Smith v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Telephone Company, the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the work-
ers' compensation commission's decision to deny compensation be-
cause scientists had not yet proven MCS as a clinical disorder.129 The 
employee in Smith claimed to have inhaled fumes at work on three 
individual occasions during July and August of 1991.130 After each 
incident, the employee reported symptoms of headaches, nausea, diz-
ziness, shortness of breath, erratic heartbeat, loss of voice, cough, and 
sore throat.m The claimant saw a doctor who diagnosed her with 
MCS.132 Then, the telephone company requested that she see another 
123 See Harris v. Central Arkansas Maintenance, No. CA 93-655, 1994 WL 146333, at *2-3 
(Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1994); Chanin v. Eastern Virginia Med. Sch., 459 S.E.2d 523, 524 (Vir. 
Ct. App. 1995); Smith v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., No. 1048-94-1, 1995 WL 228247, at *2 
(Va. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1995); Conradt v. Mt. Carmel Sch., 539 N.W.2d 713, 715-18 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1995). 
124 See, e.g., Harris, 1994 WL 146333, at *2-3; Smith, 1995 WL 228247, at *2. 
125 Harris, 1994 WL 146333, at *2-3. 
126 [d. at *1. 
127 [d. at *2. 
128 [d. at *4. 
129 Smith v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., No. 1048-94-1, 1995 WL 228247, at *3 (Va. Ct. 
App. Apr. 18, 1995). 
130 [d. at *1. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. at *2. 
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doctor who later disputed the first doctor's diagnosis of MCS.133 The 
second doctor stated that there was no diagnostic test to support a 
finding of MCS and no generally accepted scientific understanding of 
causality for such a condition.134 In denying workers' compensation 
benefits, the commission accepted the opinion of the second doctor and 
rejected the opinion of the first doctor, doubting the very existence of 
MCS.13s 
D. Cases Denying Compensation for MCS While Awarding 
Compensation for Other Work-place Related Illnesses 
In contrast to court decisions which denied compensation benefits 
to MCS suffers outright, some courts have given workers' compensa-
tion to employees who claimed to suffer from MCS as well as from 
other illnesses caused by work-place exposures.136 In these cases, 
courts awarded disability compensation to employees because they 
found that one of the employees' other illnesses was an occupational 
disease.137 In not one of these cases, however, did the court find MCS 
to be a compensable occupational disease.138 
In the 1991 workers' compensation case of Fuyat v. Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the 
workers' compensation board's decision to deny compensation to a 
laboratory chemist for her claim of MCS, but awarded compensation 
for another disease called trigeminal neuralgia.139 The employee claimed 
that her exposure to aqua rega fumes at work in July of 1985 was the 
triggering event that led to her chemical sensitivities.140 '!\vo clinical 
ecologists diagnosed the employee with MCS.141 On appeal, the em-
ployer argued that the testimony of these two clinical ecologists should 
not have been admissible because clinical ecology is not recognized by 
the American Medical Association.142 The court disagreed with the 
133 [d. at *3. 
134 Smith, 1995 WL 228247, at *3. 
135 [d. 
136 See Dobbs v. Board of Supervisors, 588 So. 2d 764, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Fuyat v. Los 
Alamos Nat'J Lab., 811 P.2d 1313, 1316 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Saif Corp. v. Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 
1190 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
137 See Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 766; Fuyat, 811 P.2d at 1316; Saif Corp., 824 P.2d at 1190. 
138 See Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 766; Fuyat, 811 P.2d at 1316; Sail Corp., 824 P.2d at 1190; see also 
Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 926-27 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
139 Fuyat, 811 P.2d at 1316. 
140 [d. at 1315. 
141 [d. at 1317. 
142 [d. 
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employer's argument and stated that the testimony of the clinical 
ecologists was admissible, although the ecologists' poor reputation did 
affect the weight the judge would give to the testimony.143 After 
admitting the testimony, the court then went on to reject the diagno-
sis of MCS because of the clinical ecologist's lack of credibility.144 The 
court, however, did award the employee permanent partial disability 
for the disease of trigeminal neuralgia.145 
Likewise, in the 1991 case of Dobbs v. Board of Supervisors and the 
1992 case of Saif Corporation v. Scott, the Louisiana Court of Appeal 
and the Oregon Court of Appeals denied workers' compensation for 
employees' claims of MCS, but awarded compensation for other ill-
nesses from which the employees suffered.146 The courts in these two 
cases accepted doctors' diagnoses for other illnesses, but refused to 
accept the diagnosis of MCS based on the reasoning that MCS is a 
disease of everyday life, and is still controversial within the medical 
community. 147 
Moreover, in the 1995 case of Armstrong v. City of Wichita, the 
Court of Appeals of Kansas refused to label the claimant's occupa-
tional disease as MCS but awarded him benefits anyway, even though 
it could not identify his condition as any other known medical illness.148 
The claimant, Dan Armstrong, testified that he had suffered from 
weakness, confusion, headaches, tremors, diarrhea, and fatigue ever 
since he was exposed to two separate chemicals at his job in 1989.149 
After hearing conflicting testimony from doctors as to whether or not 
the claimant suffered from MCS, the workers' compensation board 
determined that it was not necessary to decide whether MCS was a 
clinical diagnosis, or to label the particular occupational disease from 
which the claimant suffered, when issuing benefits.150 The Court of 
Appeals of Kansas affirmed the decision of the appeals board conclud-
ing that Armstrong suffered from a compensable occupational dis-
ease, but also refused to recognize MCS as the valid medical term 
describing the disability.151 
14.3Id. 
144 Fuyat, 811 P.2d at 1317. 
145Id. at 1318. 
146 See Dobbs v. Board of Supervisors, 588 So. 2d 764, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Saif Corp. v. 
Scott, 824 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
147 See Dobbs, 588 So. 2d at 766; Sail Corp., 824 P.2d at 1190. 
148 See Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
149 I d. at 925. 
150 Id. at 927-28. 
151 Id. at 928. 
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E. Cases Where Courts Have Treated MCS as a Clinical Illness 
that Deserves Compensation 
Only two courts thus far have recognized MCS as an actual clinical 
illness, and of these two cases only one has awarded any disability 
compensation.152 Additionally, from its finding that the employee was 
only partially disabled, it is apparent that even this one court did not 
fully understand the serious implications of the disease.153 
In the 1993 case of Yanarella v. IBM Corporation, the New York 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the workers' compensation 
board, holding that a computer programmer was partially disabled 
from exposure to chemicals at work. l54 Although the medical evidence 
presented did persuade the board that the employee suffered from 
MCS, the board only granted partial disability for the disorder.155 
Additionally, the board concluded that the claimant was employable 
as a computer programmer in a nonindustrial environment.156 
In addition to Yanarella, the court in Appeal of Kehoe recognized 
MCS as an actual clinical illness.157 In this 1994 case, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court decided that a workers' compensation board did 
not adequately determine whether Kehoe was suffering from MCS 
when the board denied her benefits.158 Kehoe worked at Lockheed-
Sanders from 1979 through 1991 and claimed that her headaches and 
respiratory problems developed from continuous exposure to chemi-
cals at her work-place.159 In its decision, the board misinterpreted 
Kehoe's diagnosis as occupational asthma, rather than MCS, and found 
that Kehoe had not proven that her symptoms were an occupational 
disease as defined by state law.160 In its reversal of the board's decision 
and remand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the board 
should have determined whether Kehoe actually suffered from MCS 
and, if so, whether the exposure to chemicals in her work-place caused 
her symptoms. l6l 
152 See Appeal of Kehoe, 648 A.2d 472, 474 (N.H. 1994); Yanarella v. IBM Corp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 
768,769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
153 See Yanarella, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 769. 
154 [d. 
155 [d. 
156 [d. 
157 Appeal of Kehoe, 648 A.2d 472, 474 (N.H. 1994). 
158 [d. 
159 [d. at 473. 
160 [d. at 474. 
161 [d. 
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In sum, all the MCS claimants discussed in this Section attempted 
to fit MCS into their state statute's definition of occupational dis-
ease.162 Most of the compensation boards denied occupational disease 
compensation in these MCS cases, reasoning that MCS had not gained 
full acceptance in the medical community as a clinical disease, could 
not be peculiar to the work-place because it was a disease of everyday 
life, and was not caused by claimants' particular work-place tasks. l63 
From the reasoning in these cases, it is clear that MCS sufferers have 
not been able to meet the strict requirements of the statutory defini-
tion for occupational disease. 
Although MCS claimants have not been able to obtain disability 
compensation for an occupational disease, they may be able to obtain 
compensation by claiming a work-place accident.164 As described in 
Section III of this Comment, the statutory requirements for proving 
an accident are easier to satisfy than the more stringent occupational 
disease requirements.165 Furthermore, in addition to this looser statu-
tory language, the requirements for accident claims are also easier to 
satisfy because courts have significantly broadened the definition of 
accident in recent case law.l66 The following section of this Comment 
illustrates this liberal judicial reinterpretation of accident requirements. 
V. BROADENING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY 
ACCIDENT DEFINITIONS 
Many courts construe statutory accident requirements extremely 
broadly in order to compensate employees suffering from non-tradi-
tional work-related disorders.167 This broadening of the statutory re-
162 See supra notes 103---B1 and accompanying text. 
163 See id. 
164 See Lockeby v. Massey Pulpwood, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); Castaneda 
v. Illinois Indus. Comm'n, 596 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Condon v. Boeing Co., 903 
P.2d 775, 777 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Parks v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 340 So. 2d 276, 281 (La. 
1976); Robin v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1030, 1033-34 (La. Ct. App. 
1994); Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 610 So. 2d 953, 955 (La. Ct. App. 
1992); Scanlan v. Bernard Lumber Co., 365 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Bodily v. John Jump 
Trucking, Inc., 819 P.2d 1262,1269 (Mont. 1991); Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 
440,445 (Neb. 1992); Hayes v. A.M. Cohron, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Neb. 1987); Sandel v. 
Packaging Co. of Am., 317 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Neb. 1982); Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 
373, 376 (Tenn. 1991). 
165 See supra Section III. 
166 See infra Section V. 
167 See, e.g., Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705; Castaneda, 596 N.E.2d at 1284; Condon, 903 P.2d at 
777; Parks, 340 So. 2d at 281. 
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quirements of accident definitions can be seen in workers' compensa-
tion cases focusing on Cumulative Trauma Disorders (CTDs).l68 
Sufferers of CTDs, work-place injuries similar to MCS in several 
respects, have obtained workers' compensation by classifying their 
disorders as accidents rather than as occupational diseases.169 MCS 
claimants have not attempted to take advantage of this broadening 
standard for work-place accidents and as a result are being denied 
compensation under the less expansive definitions of occupational 
disease.17o Because CTDs are similar to MCS illnesses in several ways, 
MCS sufferers should look to accident theories that CTD sufferers 
have used to obtain disability compensation. 
A. Similarities Between MCS and CTD Workers' 
Compensation Cases 
CTDs involve injuries to tendons, muscles, and nerves of the hands, 
wrists, elbows, arms, shoulders, legs, or back that are caused by 
repetitive motion of those areas.l7l Similar to MCS sufferers, the 
injured worker in CTD cases has the burden of proving causation 
from expert medical testimony.172 In addition, as with MCS, there 
exists no single diagnostic test that proves the existence of CTDs.173 
Therefore, doctors must diagnose the presence or absence of the 
disorder based on the patients' own subjective descriptions of symp-
toms, work conditions, and medical history.174 Additionally, both MCS 
and CTDs often are cumulative in nature, occurring after repeated 
exposure to low-level chemicals in the case of MCS, or after repetitive 
limb motions in the case of CTDs.175 Furthermore, both disorders 
often are not peculiar to a particular industry or trade.176 
168 See, e.g., Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705; Castaneda, 596 N.E.2d at 1284; Condon, 903 P.2d at 
777; Parks, 340 So. 2d at 281. 
169 See, e.g., Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705; Castaneda, 596 N.E.2d at 1284; Condon, 903 P.2d at 
777; Parks, 340 So. 2d at 281. 
170 See supra Section IV. 
171 See Denis P. Juge, et a!., Cumulative Trauma Disorders-The Disease of the 90's: An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis, 55 LA. L. REV. 895, 897 (1995). 
172 See, e.g., Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705; Castaneda, 596 N.E.2d at 1284; Condon, 903 P.2d at 
777; Parks, 340 So. 2d at 281. 
173 See Juge, supra note 171, at 899. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
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B. CTD Cases Granting Compensation Under Statutory 
Accident Definitions 
Courts have had little difficulty in adapting the legislative definition 
of accident to award disability compensation to sufferers of CTDs.177 
Most state workers' compensation acts require an accident to be 
unexpected and sudden in order to be compensable.178 To fit CTDs into 
this definition, courts liberally construe these statutes by expanding 
the unexpected and sudden requirements.179 
Many courts now consider the unexpected or unforeseen element 
of an accident to be met if the cause of the injury was of an accidental 
character and not intentional.18o As early as 1976, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Parks v. Insurance Co. of North America began to 
broaden the unexpected requirement of the accident definition.181 The 
court held that an employee's work-induced chronic bronchitis satisfied 
the unexpected requirement of the accident definition simply because 
the disorder was an unexpected effect upon the employee.182 In Sandel 
v. Packaging Co. of America, the Nebraska Supreme Court further 
broadened the unexpected requirement. l83 The court held that the 
CTD injury was unexpected because no evidence could show that 
Sandel had intentionally bent her elbow to cause an injury, or that she 
had expected such an injury to happen. l84 Similar to Parks and Sandel, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, Inc., 
liberalized the unexpected requirement when it determined that the 
cause of the employee's carpal tunnel syndrome was of an accidental 
character and the effect was unforeseen.185 In sum, any unintentional 
injury or disorder caused by the work-place can be determined to 
meet the unexpected requirement of the accident definition as long as 
there is no intent on the part of the worker to become injured.186 
177 Id. at 898-904. 
178 See LARSON, supra note 61, § 37.20. 
179 See Ronald T. Dowse, Workers' Compensation Injuries: What's the Big Deal? Making a 
Choice Between Occupational Disease and Accident, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 149, 149-57 (1992). 
180 See, e.g., Parks v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 340 So. 2d 276, 281 (La. 1976); Schlup v. Auburn 
Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Neb. 1992); Sandel v. Packaging Co. of Am., 317 N.W.2d 
910,915 (Neb. 1982). 
181 Parks, 340 So. 2d at 281. 
182 Id. 
183 Sandel, 317 N.W.2d at 915. 
184 Id. 
185 See Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Neb. 1992). 
186 See, e.g., id.; Sandel, 317 N.W.2d at 915. 
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In addition to broadening the unexpected requirement, many courts 
now loosely interpret the second statutory requirement that an acci-
dent be sudden.187 Courts now find that a disorder does not have to 
be sudden in the sense of having a definite time and place.lss Rather, 
these courts have held that a claimant can satisfy the sudden require-
ment by a showing that there was a series of minor traumas which 
produced the disorder.189 In Lockeby v. Massey Pulpwood, Inc., for 
example, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found that, even though an 
employee with back pain could not point to a specific incident of injury, 
his repeated trauma could form the basis of an accidental injury.19o 
Likewise, in Robin v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal held that an employee with severe back 
problems was subjected to several micro-traumas in the performance 
of her duties.19I Similar to Lockeby and Robin, the Montana Supreme 
Court in Bodily v. John Jump Trucking, Inc., broadened the accident 
definition by holding that the sudden requirement can apply to either 
the cause of the injury or to the result of the injury.192 Furthermore, 
in Hayes v. A. M. Cohron, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme Court went 
so far as to state that the Nebraska workers' compensation statute 
now includes injuries resulting from repeated traumas ultimately 
producing disability.193 In many states, judicial interpretations of ac-
cident definitions have expanded such that one identifiable moment 
of injury is no longer required as a prerequisite for compensation.194 
Recently, courts not only have defined cumulative injuries as acci-
dents, but also have helped employees to create identifiable moments 
of injury for these disorders.195 While many courts no longer require 
187 See Lockeby v. Massey Pulpwood, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); Robin v. 
Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1030, 1033-34 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Bodily v. 
John Jump Trucking, Inc., 819 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Mont. 1991); Hayes v. A.M. Cohron, Inc., 400 
N.W.2d 244, 246 (Neb. 1987). 
188 See Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 715; Robin, 646 So. 2d at 1033-34; Bodily, 819 P.2d at 1269; 
Hayes, 400 N.W.2d at 246. 
189 See Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705; Robin, 646 So. 2d at 1033-34; Bodily, 819 P.2d at 1269; 
Hayes, 400 N.W.2d at 246. 
190 Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705. 
191 Robin, 646 So. 2d at 1033-34. 
192 See Bodily, 819 P.2d at 1269. 
193 Hayes, 400 N.W.2d at 246. 
194 See Lockeby, 812 S.W.2d at 705; Robin, 646 So. 2d at 1034; Bodily, 819 P.2d at 1269; Hayes, 
400 N.W.2d at 246. 
195 See Condon v. Boeing Co., 903 P.2d 775, 777 (Ran. Ct. App. 1995); Dyson v. State Employees 
Group Benefits Program, 610 So. 2d 953, 955 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 
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one specific moment of injury, the date of injury is still important 
for determining a date from when the employee deserves disability 
benefits.196 In Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, a 
clerk who developed pain in her feet from standing all day at a 
photocopier was awarded benefits under an accident claim.197 The 
Louisiana Court of Appeal created an identifiable moment of injury 
based on the claimant's testimony that on a particular day she felt a 
sharp pain in her feet. 198 Accordingly, the court held that her cumula-
tive injury met the sudden requirement of an accident under the 
statute.199 
Similar to Dyson, the Illinois Appellate Court in Castaneda v. Illi-
nois Industrial Commission created an identifiable moment of injury 
in order to award the claimant benefits under the accident defini-
tion.20o The court determined that the moment of injury for an em-
ployee suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome was the date that the 
claimant's doctor first related her hand problems to her employment.201 
Likewise, in Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., the Tennessee Supreme 
Court concluded that the date of injury for an employee suffering 
from carpal tunnel syndrome was the date when the condition finally 
prevented her from performing her work.202 Finally, in Condon v. 
Boeing Co., the Kansas Court of Appeals found an employee's carpal 
tunnel syndrome to be a hybrid condition lying somewhere in between 
the strict definitions of accident and occupational disease.203 In order 
to award benefits, however, the court hesitatingly characterized the 
syndrome as an accident and found the date of injury to be the last 
date of work of the claimant.204 
Courts in CTD cases have justified the broadening of their inter-
pretations of statutory accident requirements by reasoning that the 
purpose behind the workers' compensation system-to compensate 
all victims of work-place injuries and disorders-is better served with 
a more expansive definition.205 The court in Dyson v. State Employees 
196 See Condon, 903 P.2d at 777; Dyson, 610 So. 2d at 955; Barker, 805 S.W.2d at 376. 
197 Dyson, 610 So. 2d at 955. 
198 [d. 
199 [d. 
200 See Castaneda v. Illinois Indus. Comm'n, 596 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
201 [d. 
202 Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tenn. 1991). 
203 Condon v. Boeing Co., 903 P.2d 775, 777 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
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205 See id.; Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 610 So. 2d 953, 955 (La. Ct. 
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Group Benefits Program stated that denying workers who are "worn 
down by their work rather than immediately crippled by it" was 
inconsistent with the purpose of the state workers' compensation 
act.206 Similarly, in Condon, the court determined that the elements of 
the accident definition should not be construed in a strict or literal 
sense, but "in a manner designed to effectuate the purpose of the 
workers' compensation act that the employer bear the expense of 
accidental injury to a worker caused by the employment.''207 
Many courts are willing to manipulate statutory requirements for 
work-related accidents in order to compensate victims of occupational 
disorders who they feel deserve compensation.208 This broad judicial 
interpretation of accident requirements is evident in the above-de-
scribed CTD cases. Now that courts have expanded their interpreta-
tions of statutory accident requirements for nontraditional work-place 
accidents such as CTDs, MCS claimants seeking workers' compensa-
tion may find this broad definition of accident to be more useful than 
a claim of occupational disease.209 
VI. PROPOSAL: MCS SUFFERERS SHOULD PURSUE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION CLAIMS UNDER THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF 
ACCIDENT 
Claimants in workers' compensation cases focusing on MCS may 
have a better chance of receiving benefits by classifying the syndrome 
as an accident rather than an occupational disease.21o MCS claimants 
can meet both the sudden and the unexpected requirements of statu-
tory accident definitions.211 Once MCS claimants satisfy these ele-
ments, they have satisfied their burden of proving that their disorder 
arose out of and in the course of the work-place, and are entitled to 
workers' disability compensation.212 
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MCS claimants meet the unexpected requirement of accident defini-
tions because afflicted employees do not expect or foresee that they 
will develop the syndrome.213 Similar to Sandel where the court found 
that an employee's disorder was unexpected simply because nothing 
in the evidence could show that she had intentionally bent her elbow 
to cause an injury, courts in MCS compensation cases should find that 
claimants' disorders were unexpected because the employees did not 
intend to develop sensitivities to certain chemicals found in their 
work-places.214 In addition, like Schlup where the court determined 
that the unexpected element of an accident was met because the 
disabling effect of an employee's CTD was unforeseen, courts in MCS 
cases should find that the disabling effect of certain combinations of 
low-level chemicals on employees are also unforeseen.215 
In addition to satisfying the unexpected requirement of the acci-
dent definition, MCS claimants also can satisfy the sudden or time 
definiteness requirement.216 Although MCS claimants usually cannot 
identify a sudden or exact moment of chemical exposure, the disorder 
can be categorized as a series of micro-traumas.217 This tactic was 
employed in Robin where the court characterized an employee's se-
vere back problems as a series ofmicro-traumas.218 Additionally, using 
the holding in Bodily that the time definiteness requirement can 
apply to either the cause or result of the injury, MCS claimants could 
satisfy the sudden requirement by applying it to the result of the 
injury.219 Although MCS often occurs gradually, it results in very definite 
symptoms including respiratory problems, gastrointestinal problems, 
and neurological disorders.22o Furthermore, under the Hayes v. A.M. 
Cohron, Inc. holding that accidents now include injuries resulting 
from repeated traumas ultimately producing disability, courts can also 
label MCS as an accident.221 MCS is the result of repeated traumatic 
213 See Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Neb. 1992); Sandel v. 
Packaging Co. of Am., 317 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Neb. 1982). 
214 See Sandel, 317 N.W.2d at 915. 
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exposure to environmental chemicals which ultimately produces to-
tally disabling symptoms.222 
When claimants are able to prove these two elements of the acci-
dent definition, courts usually find that the disorder arose out of their 
employment.223 Thus, if MCS sufferers can prove that MCS is an 
unexpected and sudden disorder that arose out of their employment, 
they have a good chance of receiving disability compensation.224 
By claiming an occupational accident, workers also can avoid the 
more daunting requirements of the occupational disease category.225 
MCS sufferers would no longer have to prove that the syndrome is 
not a common illness of everyday life.226 This belief that MCS is an 
ordinary disease of life was the main factor preventing recovery in 
Ruether v. State of Arizona and Weekley v. Industrial Commission, 
where the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Illinois Appeals Court 
stressed that MCS could be derived from non-work related sources.227 
Additionally, claimants would not have the burden of proving that the 
syndrome is due to causes and conditions peculiar to a particular 
employment.228 This requirement prevented recovery in McCreary v. 
Industrial Commission of Arizona and Weekley, where the Arizona 
Court of Appeals and the Illinois Appeals Court, respectively, found 
that because office remodeling was not a particular and unavoidable 
risk stemming from the nature of the employees' engineering and 
secretarial duties, they did not suffer from compensable occupational 
diseases.229 By claiming that MCS is a work-place accident, employees 
can avoid the occupational disease standards that previously have 
prevented recovery for MCS, as well as take advantage of the broad-
ening judicial interpretation of work-place accident under state work-
ers' compensation statutes.230 
222 See supra Section II.B. 
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A. Helpful Strategies for MCS Claimants Applying for 
Workers' Compensation 
Employees suffering from MCS who wish to apply for workers' 
disability compensation should follow a number of steps in developing 
their case. First, they should start by claiming accident under their 
state's workers' compensation act.231 Next, claimants should visit sev-
eral doctors (preferably not all clinical ecologists) who will diagnose 
them with MCS and testify both that the syndrome arose out of the 
work-place and that they are totally and permanently disabled by the 
disease.232 In addition, claimants should try to establish some specific 
instance of sensitization when they believe they were exposed to a 
chemical or a combination of chemicals which later triggered their 
reactions to everyday chemical exposures.233 Claimants can identify 
their moment of injury as a particular moment of acute exposure,234 
as the first date of medical diagnosis/35 or the date that the chemical 
sensitivities finally prevented them from performing their work.236 
Citing a specific instance of injury is not essential, but it is very 
helpful in establishing that an accident in fact occurred and in laying 
out a date from which the court can award disability compensation.237 
Finally, claimants should rely on those accident cases in their state that 
interpret the unexpected and sudden accident requirements broadly.238 
U sing these techniques, MCS claimants may have a better chance of 
winning disability benefits than under a claim for occupational dis-
ease.239 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With thousands of work-place disorders being discovered each year, 
the trend in workers' compensation cases seems to be heading toward 
eliminating the technical constructions of accident and occupational 
disease and melding the two definitions into one standard for compen-
231 See supra Section V. 
232 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. 
234 See Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 610 So. 2d 953, 955 (La. Ct. App. 
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sation.240 This trend enhances the purpose behind workers' compen-
sation of compensating employees for any loss of income caused by 
injurious conditions of their employment.241 As more and more courts 
stop differentiating between accidents and occupational diseases in 
these hybrid disorder cases, MCS claimants may not need to mold 
their cases to fit one definition or the other to be compensated. Until 
that time comes, however, employees seeking workers' compensation 
for MCS should give the ever-broadening accident claim a try. 
240 Dowse, supra note 179, at 164. 
241 See Bennett, supra note 61, at 212. 
